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PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
LUCILE LOMEN
At the close of the Civil War, the federal government was faced with
the serious problem of protecting the newly freed negro from restrictions
which the state governments might see fit to impose upon him. The
War had been won and the negro freed, but there was no power in the
federal government which could insure his civil liberties against state
action. The Bill of Rights formed a bulwark against invasion of
personal rights by the federal government, but it had no application to
other jurisdictions.' It was to remedy this situation that the Fourteenth
Amendment was proposed and adopted. The control which it gives
over state legislation is both positive and negative in character-the
negative control being the more frequently invoked. The section of this
Amendment which is the source of most of the limitations on the power
of state legislation provides that "No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 2 This restriction on
the exercise of the police power is, of course, given effect by the judicial
arm of the federal government. The Amendment also provides that the
legislative branch of the federal government shall have a power to
secure the civil liberties of the people and that power is derived from
the section which reads: "Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article".'
"Due process" and "equal protection" are familiar phrases, even to
the layman, but the "privileges or immunities" clause has been so
interpreted by the Supreme Court as to be of considerably less practical
significance. At various times, members of the Reconstruction Committee expressed the opinion that the privileges and immunities protected
by this measure would be those fundamental rights of citizenship
delineated by Mr. Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell' combined
I Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131
(1887).
2

U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1.

3Id. § 5.

' 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380 (1823). "The inquiry is, what are the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in
confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which
are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of
all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of
their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental
principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following several
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with the guarantees of the first eight amendments.' Each word of the
Amendment was carefully weighed before being used, and each had a
definite duty to perform in securing that measure of protection against
possible state limitations on civil rights which the Reconstruction Committee deemed necessary under the conditions resulting from the civil
strife which had aroused so much animosity and desire among the
Southerners to hold the negro in a position of mere nominal freedom.
Clearly the framers of the Amendment intended that it should be
broadly construed, with full meaning to be given each word just as it
was written.! The civil rights of the citizens of the United States were
thus consciously entrusted to the federal government. It is the purpose
of this essay to trace the judicial history of but one of the guaranteesto determine the effectiveness of the privileges and immunities clause
which, on its face, emancipates citizens from state supervision of civil
rights.
I.

Before the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment there had been
judicial recognition given to the existence of some rights in citizens of
the federal government which could not be abridged by action on the
part of the states, though the federal Constitution and statutes contained
no specific guarantees with r e s p e c t to these rights. The state of
Nevada had passed a law imposing on transportation companies a
capitation tax of $1.00 on any person leaving the state through the
heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty,
with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.
The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any
other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute
and maintain actions of any kind in -the courts of the state; to take, hold
and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from
higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of, the
state; may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of
privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added, the elective
franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the
state in which it is to be exercised."
I Senator Howard, presenting the Amendment to the Senate, quoted
at length from Corfield v. Coryell, supra n. 4, and then went on to say,
"Such is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken of in the
second section of the fourth article of the Constitution. To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be-for they are not and cannot
be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature---ito these should
be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight
amendments of the Constitution .... Hepresented that definition as an
intimation of "what probably will be the opinion of the judiciary" in
construing the privileges and immunities clause. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.
1st Sess., pt. 3, pp. 2764-2765. See also William D. Guthrie, The Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, (1859) 59 et seq.,
STUDIEs IN HISTORY, ECONOMCS AND PuBLIc LAW, Vol. 54, pp. 44-48, published by Columbia University.
0
William D. Guthrie, supra n. 5, pp. 24, 25, 58-61; Robert Eugene Cushman, LEADING CoNsTITUTIoNAL DEcisioNs (1930) pp. 33, 34.
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facilities of a company. In 1868, the year ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was confirmed by proclamation, this law was declared unconstitutional, in Crandall v. Nevada," the Court stating that
there are certain rights inherent in citizenship which, in their nature,
are "independent of the will of any state". The right upheld in the
Crandall case was the right of unhampered transit among the states.
Though the argument was based upon the right of a citizen to travel to
the seat of the national government to assert claims upon or transact
business with that government and the right of that government to demand the passage of the citizen through any state in the exercise of his
public duties, there is no showing in the opinion that any of the passengers of the plaintiff company as to whom the tax was levied were
actually on government business. Mr. Justice Miller quoted, with approval, from the dissent in The Passengercases a passage which named
the right to travel freely from state to state as one of the rights which the
"Union was intended to obtain." This undoubtedly expands the right
from one restricted to a free egress from a state when on government
business to a free and unrestricted egress inherent in the citizenship
itself and not dependent upon the purpose of the transitY
It is of more than mere passing interest to note that it was Mr. Justice
Miller, writer of the Crandall opinion, who gave expression to the
earliest judicial construction of the Fourteenth Amendment. Not until
the Slaughter-House cases"0 , in 1873, did the nation learn the legal effect
of the privileges and immunities clause which, together with the other
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, had the power to revolutionize
the balance between national and state governments. Proponents of a
strong centralized government undoubtedly thought that this measure
would decrease state control over the people, but this hope was
effectively smothered by the opinion upholding a Louisiana statute
creating a p r i v a t e corporation to have a monopoly on livestock
landings and slaughter houses within New Orleans and the surrounding
territory. The act was purportedly for the protection of health and
was conscientiously drawn to the end that the owner corporation had
to allow local dealers to use the facilities for slaughtering their animals,
and penalties were enacted for the infractions of this provision. Moreover, maximum charges were fixed. But the butchers objected to
the creation of the monopoly even though the facilities were open to the
public. Such an arrangement forced them to work for the monopoly,
they argued, and deprived them of their civil liberties. The matter
eventually reached the Supreme Court where the constitutionality of the
'6 Wall. 35 (1868).
8 7 How. 283 (1849).
'See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160, 178 (1941).
10 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
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statute was challenged on the grounds that it was a violation of the
privileges or immunities clause, the due process clause and the equal
protection clause, all of which were guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment against state abridgment. The opinion gave chief attention
to the privileges or immunities clause, which it all but annihilated by the
narrow construction it placed upon it.
A necessary precedent to an analysis of the privileges and immunities
clause was an understanding of the term "citizens of the United States".
The Fourteenth Amendment contained a definition of citizenship 1
which made national citizenship primary and state citizenship secondary,
but the importance of the definition in relation to the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States was the inescapable conclusion
that national and state citizenship were two separate statuses giving rise
to different rights and obligations. Recognition of this fact limited, at
the outset, the scope of the privileges and immunities clause, for, by
its own terms, it applied only to privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States. But just what that limitation included was not easily
determined. Did the clause mean that all privileges and immunities
then enjoyed by United States citizens were henceforth to be inviolate?
Or did it mean that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, as such, were the only ones covered by the clause?
The states traditionally have had the power to protect the civil rights
of their citizens. If the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent the
states from exercising their traditional power and to secure to the
federal government authority to legislate in this field, the United States
Supreme Court would become "a perpetual censor upon all legislation
of the States, on the civil rights of their own citizens, with authority
to nullify such as it did not approve as consistent with those rights,
as they existed at the time of the adoption of this amendment"." - Such
an arrogation of power, so serious in its consequences and so contrary
to the fundamental ideals of the American federation, would be the
natural result of the construction urged by the antagonists of the
Louisiana law. Mr. Justice Miller refused to accept this construction
on the grounds that "no such results were intended by the Congress
which proposed these amendments nor by the legislatures of the
States which ratified them". This argument is appealing to those who
favor supremacy of the states, but the framers of the amendment must
have had knowledge of the implications of this clause at the time they
wrote it into the national law, and hence it would seem to follow that
they desired a fundamental change in the distribution of power. How"'U. S. CoxsT. A=zND.XIV, § 1: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."
12

16 Wall. 36, 78.
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ever, it is well settled that the force of this opinion is to protect from
abridgment by the states only such privileges and immunities as are
created by national laws. The opinion expressly precluded the possible
inclusion of any of the fundamental or natural rights within the area
protected by the clause, pointing out that such rights were traditionally
regulated by the states. Since the fundamental or natural rights, as
defined in Corfield v. Coryell by Mr. Justice Washington, were rights
belonging to a state citizen as such, and hence were not the result of
the relationship between the federal government and its citizens, the
privileges and immunities clause could not be used to safeguard these
rights.
Obviously, as the dissenting justices pointed out, 3 this construction
of the clause makes it mere surplusage. Before showing abridgment by
a state of a privilege or immunity, one must allege the existence of the
federal right being abridged. To aver the existence of the right is to
expose the redundancy of the privileges and immunities clause, as the
very right abridgment of which forms the basis for the action would be,
in itself, a protection from state action because of the supremacy clause
in the Constitution1 ' making the federal Constitution, statutes and
treaties, the supreme law of the land.
Chief Justice Chase and Justices Swayne and Bradley concurred in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field which set forth the theory
that the fundamental rights, privileges and immunities belonging to a
free man, which the majority expressly left in the control of the states,
were now to belong to him by virtue of his national citizenship and
were not to be dependent on the states. The purpose of the Amendment, according to these judges, was not to add any new privileges or
immunities to those already conferred by former political concepts, but
the Amendment was to change jurisdiction over the "fundamental" or
"natural" rights from the state governments to that of the federal
government. Examining the Amendment in the light of history, it is
not improbable that the framers of the instrument had this in mind."
Though broad in its terms, the Amendment was conceived for the
protection of the negro. It would have been little aid to him to have
the privileges and immunities created by national laws protected against
state impairment while all of the fundamental rights "which belong to
him as a free man and a free citizen"--those rights which affected his
whole manner of living-were left to the unfettered discretion of the
local governments.
" 16 Wall. 36, 96. See also D. 0. McGovney, Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 4 IowA L. BUL. 219, 230 (1918)
for his discussion.
"Article VI, § 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land .....
" Supra n. 5.
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Approximately two dozen times during the next quarter century, the
clause was invoked and found wanting in the authority within it to protect and preserve a citizen's rights from impairment by state legislation."
The most famous exclusionary pronouncement to follow the SlaughterHouse cases, which excluded from consideration under this clause all
privileges and immunities except those which owed their existence
specifically to the relationship between the federal government and its
citizens, was the opinion in Maxwell v. Dow 7 This case arose on a
petition for habeas corpus, alleging, among other charges, that a trial
by a jury of eight abridged the privileges guaranteed a citizen by the
Fourteenth Amendment, the privilege being the right to a jury of twelve
under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The petition was denied by the state court and a writ
of error was sued out to take the case to the United States Supreme
Court. Thus, it was necessary for the court to decide whether or not
the Bill of Rights was to be read into the Fourteenth Amendment, which
question had been decided negatively as pertaining to other guarantees1 8 but was considered here for the first time as regards the
privileges or immunities clause. The majority opinion presented
several cases decided subsequent to 1865 which sanctioned state tresSuch being
passing upon the rights in the first eight amendments.'
evidently
was not
privileges
and
immunities
clause
very
the case, the
construed to have absorbed the Bill of Rights intact. Moreover, though
the Slaughter-House decision and In re Kemmler ° both contained
numerous examples of privileges and immunities deemed by the court
to be encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment, neither mentioned
the right to trial by jury, which fact Mr. Justice Peckham found
somewhat persuasive in deciding the Dow case. The opinion holds, in
more straight forward language than that of the Slaughter-House case,
that if a privilege or immunity does not result exclusively and expressly
from national citizenship, it is not one reserved from state regulation:
"In none are they privileges or immunities granted and belonging to the individual as a citizen of the United States, but
they. are secured to all persons as against the Federal Government, entirely irrespective of such citizenship. As the indi10 Some of the cases during this period excluded from the privileges and
immunities clause the right ,to sell intoxicating liquor as well as the right
to manufacture it, Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, 133 (1873); Crowley
v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 (1890); the right to practice law in a state
court, Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873); the right to vote in an election, Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1875); the right to be hanged instead of electrocuted, In re Kemmler, 136 U. S.436 (1890); the right to
practice medicine, Dent. v. West Va., 129 U. S. 114 (1889).
17176 U. S.581 (1899).
18 Conviction upon information rather than indictment held not a violation of the due process clause, Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S.516 (1883).
19 176 U. S.581, 584 et seq:
20 136 U. S. 436, 448.
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vidual does not enjoy them as a privilege of citizenship of the
United States, therefore, when the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the abridgment by the States of those privileges or
immunities which he enjoys as such citizen, it is not correct
or reasonable to say that it covers and extends to certain rights
which he does not enjoy by reason of his citizenship, but
simply because those rights exist in favor of all individuals as
against Federal governmental powers. The nature or character of the right of trial by jury is the same in a criminal prosecution as in a civil action, and in neither case does it spring
from nor is it founded upon the citizenship of the individual
as a citizen of the United States, and if not, then it cannot be
said that in either case it is a privilege or immunity which
alone belongs to him as such."' 1
A contrary view was expressed by Mr. Justice Harlan, who, without
enumerating the privileges and immunities individually, generalized to
the effect that the clause under consideration "embraces at least those
expressly recognized by the Constitution of the United States and
placed beyond the power of Congress to take away or impair". He
detailed the history of the Anglo-American jury and the place it had
held in the political philosophies giving birth to the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights and other sources of law in this country. Rights, such
as the right to trial by a jury of twelve, which are so firmly rooted in
Anglo-American political and jurisprudential concepts were suggested
by Mr. Justice Harlan as being the subject of protection afforded by the
privileges or immunities clause.
II.

Numerous times the Supreme Court was asked to decide the question
as to whether or not the privileges or immunities of a citizen of the
United States were being abridged, but the Court answered very
summarily in most instances, not in any case extending the doctrine
beyond the Slaughter-House limitation confining it to abridgment of
rights affirmatively established by national law, further limited by the
express exclusion of the Bill of Rights from the sphere of guarantees
immunized against impairment by the states. The history of the decisions in point from 1873 to 1908 is well summarized in the majority
opinion to Twining v. New Jersey" which, in orthodox terms, held that
exemption from compulsory self-incrimination is not within the terms
of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to be protected against abridgment by the states.
Before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment this right, in
common with those other fundamental liberties which are guaranteed
by the first eight amendments, was clearly not protected from state
action; the Bill of Rights being applicable only to the federal govern2" 176
2"211

U. S. 581, 595.
U. S. 78 (1908).
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ment, there was no provision in the national Constitution or laws
which could bring the states' regulations under federal surveillance.
Adopting the premises rejected in the Dow case, counsel for Twining
reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated in the privileges
and immunities clause the personal rights which were contained. in the
first eight amendments. To refute this argument, the decisions from
the Slaughter-House cases onward were outlined to show that
the Court had uniformly met this contention with a decided negative.
Mr. Justice Moody, declining to go into the merits of the former decisions and even admitting that it was undoubtedly the view of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the protection of
the first eight amendments as contended,"8 declared that nevertheless
the question was no longer an open one and cited Maxwell v. Dow, as
well as the cases cited therein, to indicate that the Court was now
concluded from deciding that the Fifth Amendment was absorbed by
the Fourteenth so as to protect citizens of the United States against
compulsory self-incrimination in a state court.
Again, as in Maxwell v. Dow, Mr. Justice Harlan interposed a
dissent which, consistent with his former view, urged that the Bill of
Rights should be a part of the Fourteenth Amendment. "Even if I
were anxious or willing to cripple the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment by strained or narrow interpretations, I should feel obliged
to hold that when that Amendment was adopted all these last-mentioned
exemptions [i. e., those enumerated in the first eight amendments] were
among the immunities belonging to citizens of the United States, which,
after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, no state could impair
or destroy."'" Because feeling against compulsory self-incrimination
is so strong, so much a part of the fundamental philosophy upon which
this nation was founded, the justice reasoned that it was surely one
which was in the "mind of the country" when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Such being the case, effect must be given it. The
majority decision recognized that the Bill of Rightswas in the minds
of the promulgators of the Amendment, but it sanctioned the "construction" of the Amendment by the several former decisions which had
refused to include the first eight amendments within the scope of the
Fourteenth.
In several decisions the Court points out that to have accepted the
words of the privileges or immunities clause at their face value would
have overthrown the delicate balance of power between state and federal governments. Such would have been the case to some extent
at least, but if Congress and the states saw fit to adopt an amendment
which would deflect some of the state power into national channels,
2

2

Id. at 96.
1Id.at 125.
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should the Supreme Court take upon itself the burden of "construing"
that amendment so that the evident intent of the measure will be
denied effect? This point arose in Maxwell v. Dow as counsel included in his brief excerpts from speeches and other material expressing
the views of those who urged the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court refused to be persuaded by such argument and explained that judicial recognition will not be given to the words used to
promote the passage of a measure. Rather, the Court will examine
the history and temper of the times which gave it birth and meaning.
A mosaic of social, political and economic data is no doubt essential to a
proper interpretation of a statute, but the contemporary utterances of
the legislators should be included as part of the pattern. The Court
would appear to disregard the best evidence of the meaning intended to
be written into a measure when it refuses to consider the explanations
of it made by its framers. The social and economic data serve to
explain the problem, but the words and politics of the men making the
law contain the key to their solution of it.
Since the amending process includes affirmative action by each of
the states, amendments, when adopted, are an expression of the will
of the majority and should be given effect as such-judicial interpretation may nullify the spirit of an amendment and render meaningless
the democratic process from which it results. It is hardly more detrimental to the fundamental concepts of the Union to make the federal
government sovereign over all personal rights, and thus to deprive the
states of a measure of power, then to deny most of the desired effect to
the wishes of three-fourths of the members of that Union, expressed in a
constitutional amendment.
Perhaps, practically speaking, neither course is too drastic in the
effect it has had or would have had on this democracy. Since the
Court, in the last analysis, consists of men subject to the same
psychological factors that influence the growth and development of law
generally, a law is usually interpreted in the light of conditions and
feelings at the time of interpretation rather than passage of the law.
And this would seem to be true in the case of the privileges and immunities clause as well as of other measures, even though Maxwell v. Dow
claimed that interpretation was based on the state of the nation at the
time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. Looking back, it would
seem that the American form of government would have been no more
changed by the adoption of the argument that the privileges and immunities clause embraced the fundamental personal liberties which had
been in the hands of the states, or at least those, as urged by Mr.
Justice Harlan, which were set forth in the Bill of Rights. The due
process clause has been used to protect many personal rights and it
may be said to have revolutionized the interaction of state and federal
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power in that field but few would argue that the clause should be
emasculated to prevent such a result.
I.
The Slaughter-House cases had relegated the privileges and immunities clause to a position of no consequence and for approximately sixty
years, though it was invoked nearly fifty times, " no state laws were
struck down on the strength of this provision. It was not before 1935
that this chain of decisions was broken by Colgate v. Harvey." The
litigation involved the validity of a tax statute of Vermont which imposed a tax of 4 per cent on income from interest-bearing securities but
granted an exemption with respect to interest received on account of
money lent within the state not exceeding 5 per cent. The plaintiff's
income, to a large extent, consisted of interest on notes and mortgages
representing money lent outside the state at interest not exceeding 5
per cent, on which the 4 per cent tax was levied. Among other contentions, the plaintiff included the charge that the act violated the
privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It
was struck down as a violation of this provision, and the language contained in the opinion indicated it probably could have been struck
22
down on the equal protection clause as well.
The opinion reviewed the premise that under the Fourteenth Amendment there is a duality of citizenship in the United States. Starting
from this point, Mr. Justice Sutherland arrived at the conclusion that
"under the Fourteenth Amendment therefore, the simple inquiry is
whether the privilege claimed is one which arises in virtue of national
citizenship. If the privilege be of that character, no state can abridge
it." To demonstrate the rights which he had in mind, he referred to
the Crandall case. Throughout his analysis, the Justice emphasized
that the right protected in the Crandall case was predicated upon the
"essential character of national citizenship" and that this right, in
common with unnamed others, owed its existence "to the Federal government, its National character, is Constitution, or its laws". In the
opinion of the majority, the power to tax income in the manner
attempted by Vermont could have prevented loans outside of the state
altogether by being carried a step further. Therefore it was held to be
an abridgment of the privilege of a citizen of the United States:
2

GFor list see dissent of Mr. Justice Stone to Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U. S. 404, note 2 on page 445.
26296 U. S. 404 (1935).

27But equal protection was expressly declared not to be violated by a
Kentucky statute imposing a tax five times as great on money deposited in
banks outside the state as it did on money deposited within the state. The
difference in taxation was justified because of "the difference in the difficulties and expenses of tax collection." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S.
83, 88 and 89 (1939).
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"The right of a citizen of the United States to engage in
business to transact any lawful business, or to make a lawful
loan of money in any state other than that in which the citizen
resides is a privilege equally attributable to his national citizenship. A state law prohibiting the exercise of any of these
rights in another state would,
therefore, be invalid under the
'8
Fourteenth Amendment.'
Although the privileges or immunities clause had had such an unsuccessful career, Mr. Justice Sutherland did not feel that it was
mere surplusage:
"The purpose of the pertinent clause in the Fourth Article
was to require each state to accord equality of treatment to the
citizens of other states in respect of the privileges and immunities of state citizenship. It has always been so interpreted.
One purpose and effect of the privileges and immunities clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, read in the light of this interpretation, was to bridge the gap left by that article so as also
to safeguard citizens of the United States against any legislation of their own states having the effect of denying equality
of treatment in respect of the exercise of their privileges of
national citizenship in other states. A provision which thus
extended and completed the shield of national protection
between the citizen and hostile and discriminating state legislation cannot be lightly dismissed as a mere duplication, or
of subordinate value, or as an almost forgotten clause of the
Constitution.""'
Mr. Justice Stone, supported by Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr.
Justice Cardozo, interposed a vigorous dissent which reiterated the
previous decisions allegedly vitiating the clause now relied upon. The
position of the dissenters is orthodox indeed and is supported by all of
the former decisions in point. But as the majority pointed out, no
case on these precise facts had previously been presented to the Court,
so that the former decisions were not conclusive in the instant case.
Having held that there are privileges or immunities belonging to citizens
of the United States as such, the Court must examine each new situation
separately to determine whether or not it falls within the charmed
circle.
The Colgate holding, had it not come to an early end, would have
substantially increased the sphere of national protection afforded to
economic activities across state lines. The Commerce Clause is still the
historic safeguard against state action discriminating in favor of local
and against interstate commerce. The privileges and immunities clause
of Article IV, Sec. 2 prevents discrimination in favor of local citizens
and against citizens of other states even in the field of local activities,
28 296 U. S. 404, 430.
29

Id. at 431.
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and the Colgate doctrine would have made the same activities immune
from discrimination on the ground of their intrastate or extrastate
character. Thus, the opinion itself intimated that the taking out of
insurance in another state, even where the insured acts from and in his
own state, would be the exercise of a right of national citizenship protected against abridgment under the Fourteenth Amendment.
But this decision was not to last long. After only four years, during
which time it had not been able to make any real extension of the
applicability of the privileges and immunities clause, ° Colgate v.
Harvey was supplanted by Madden v. Kentucky"' which ruled that a
higher tax on out-of-state than on intrastate bank deposits is constitutional and not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The privilege
urged as the subject of national protection against state abridgment was
the right to carry on business beyond the lines of the state of one's residence. This right, claimed as being inherent in national citizenship,
had been recognized by Colgate v. Harvey, and would have been upheld
on the basis of the former decision by Justices Roberts and McReynolds.
But theright to carry out an incident to trade or business, the majority
declared, does not spring from national citizenship'; it is saved to the
citizen by virtue of state 'citizenship. Interference with the state's
power of taxation is so important and far-reaching in its consequences
that the Constitution must clearly and unequivocally create the power
to interfere before the Court can reach a conclusion permitting it.
The Madden case relied on the language of the decision in Hague v.
C.I.O.,"2 decided the preceding year." The C.I.O. case is very interesting in that Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Black saw fit to place
their decision on the privileges and immunities clause whereas the due
process clause was equally capable of bearing the burden and it had
been the fashion of the Court to avoid the privileges and immunities
clause, Colgate v. Harvey being a notable exception to this. In fact,
Mr. Justice Stone wrote a concurring opinion based on the due process
clause in which he was joined'by Mr. Justice Reed. Further differences
of opinion on the "Court were indicated in a brief concurring opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, who agreed with Justice Roberts on the
merits and with Justice Stone on the question of record being insufficient
ao The Court rejected the argument that state statutes abridged guarantees of the clause in rthe following cases decided between the Colgate
and the Madden cases: prohibiting sale of convict-made goods does not
abridge a constitutional right as long as no discrimination is made between
goods made within and without the state, Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431
(1935); the right to vote may be restricted by the states, Breedlove v.
Suttles, 302 U. S. 277 (1937); appeal by state in a criminal case so that
sentence is changed from life imprisonment to death does not violate
this clause, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
31309 U. S. 83 (1939).

32
307 U. S. 498 (1938).
3
8309 U. S. 83, 90.
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to support a decision on the privileges or immunities basis, in Mr.
Justice McReynolds' dissent placed on the ground that intimate local
affairs are beyond the reach of the federal courts, and in Mr. Justice
Butler's dissent on the basis of a former decision. The unaccounted
for members of the Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice
Douglas, did not participate in the decision.
An ordinance of Jersey City, New Jersey, forbade the leasing of any
hall for the purpose of holding public meetings unless a permit
had been granted by the Chief of Police; another ordinance forbade
the distribution of printed matter on the streets or other public places.
The C.I.O., desirous of discussing certain issues under the National
Labor Relations Act, was repeatedly denied permission to hold a meeting and was prevented, through arrest and prosecution of its members,
from distributing printed matter. An injunction was sought to restrain
the enforcement of these ordinances which were alleged to be in violation
of the constitutional rights of free speech and of assembly.
The issue discussed by Mr. Justice Roberts narrowed down to the
question whether or not the dissemination, by speech and by the
written word, of information concerning national legislation is a privilege secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against state abridgment.
Not much authority was needed for the proposition that the right to
assemble and to discuss these topics is a privilege inherent in citizenship
of the United States and hence protected. Classification of this as a
privilege within the Fourteenth Amendment was predicated upon the
nature of the matter to be discussed. The opinion did not approach the
right of free speech or assembly in general terms but properly confined
itself to the facts at hand, viz., matters pertaining to the federal
government.
Though perhaps the Crandall case would today be decided on the
interstate commerce clause, the rationale that was used in 1868 might
be a possible approach to obtain the C.I.O. decision even without
reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment, as freedom to discuss national
issues is an inseparable part of the concept of democratic national
government. The right to leave a state for the purpose of traveling to
the seat of the national government to deal with that government is no
more sacred than is the right of discussion of legislative or other governmental matters. In holding that the ordinances contravened the privileges and immunities clause, the opinion indicated that use of the streets
and public places for the purpose of spreading information of a national
character has long been considered a privilege of national citizenship.
A state, even without the Fourteenth Amendment, could not be permitted to prohibit the spreading of information about the national government without impinging upon the supremacy of that government.
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Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the result but he traveled the wellworn path of due process. The due process clause was more apt in the
instant case because the privileges and immunities clause is confined
specifically to the protection of rights of citizens of the United States,
and there seemed to be some question as to whether or not the persons
here claiming its protection were citizens.
As noted above, the Madden case overruled Colgate v. Harvey, but
even if the C.I.O. case had followed the Madden decision instead of
preceding it, Mr. Justice Roberts might still have made the same
approach to the case for it was the factual situation in the Colgate
case which was taken out from under the classification of protected
privileges. The test as to what is or is not a privilege-whether a
right is inherent in national citizenship--was not repudiated by the
later ruling.
The bluntness of the Madden decision in overruling the only clearcut case that had overthrown state legislation on the grounds of being a
violation of the clause under consideration had an air of finality which
would make most men chary of resorting again to that particular
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. But, like Truth, though
crushed to earth, it rose again; whether the "eternal years of God"
shall be given the clause, time alone can tell. Two years after banishing the Colgate case, Mr. Justice Douglas, who took no part in the
C.I.O. decision, joined by Mr. Justice Black, who decided the C.I.O case
on the basis of privileges and immunities, and Mr. Justice Murphy, who
was not on the Court at the time of that decision, all of whom had
participated in the Madden case, wrote a concurring opinion invoking
the privileges and immunities clause where the majority found the
interstate commerce clause sufficient grounds on which to overthrow
the California statute prohibiting the migration to that state of "indigent
persons" and making it a misdemeanor knowingly to assist such persons
to enter the state.' Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a separate concurring
opinion based on the privileges clause also but acknowledging the
validity aid competency of the decision based on the interstate commerce clause.
The majority reasoned that since transportation of persons is commerce, therefore the prohibition was in derogation of the interstate
commerce clause. Mr. Justice Douglas, expressing no view as to the
validity of the application of the commerce clause, was fastidious about
placing the rights of persons to move freely from state to state on a
level no higher than the movement of cattle, fruit and other commodities
of commerce. He claimed the right of free transit to be an incident to
national citizenship protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
To show judicial recognition of this fact, he cited the Crandall case, as
well as the Slaughter-House decision and others since the Fourteenth
" Edwards v. California, 314 U. S. 160 (1941).
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Amendment, which list this right as one inherent in citizenship. Clearly
there is judicial dicta enough to indicate that this is one of the rights
of citizenship, but the Edwards decision is the first since the passage of
the Amendment to be placed by the concurring justices on this specific
point. The Crandall holding decided the right of freedom of egress
from a state, and the question here involved was a right of free ingress,
but the principle behind either question is the same.
IV.
The significance of the Colgate decision is not apparent to the casual
reader of the opinion. Mr. Justice Sutherland used the language which
has been used in most of the cases on this point, but it is straining the
meaning of the language to bring the result of the case in as a right
arising out of the nature or essential character of citizenship. That is,
if one examines the alleged rights which have been expressly excluded
from the scope of the clause," it should become apparent that the right
to lend money and carry on other business across state lines must
also be beyond the pale. If the unity of the United States, social and
economical, gives rise to the privilege as apparently Mr. Justice
Sutherland thought it did, then the proper classification of the privilege
should be as a fundamental right and not one based upon national citizenship, so that the effect of the Colgate decision is to repudiate the
traditional test employed since the first judicial exposition of the
applicability of the clause."6
Most of the law review writers favor the narrow construction of the
privileges and immunities clause"' and infer that had any other construction been put upon it, dire results would have followed. It is a
little hard to imagine now what control over state legislation the national
government would have secured through a more literal interpretation of
this clause than it has secured through the due process clause. The due
process clause has been used as a restraint upon substantive as well as
procedural legislation of the states. In many respects it has given the
Court an even broader basis than the privileges and immunities clause
would have given because it is not confined merely to citizens of the
United States. If the same result is obtained by another means,
"The right to trial by jury in a criminal prosecution or -the right to
be safeguarded against compulsory self-incrimination are more within the
spirit of the clause than is the right to carry on business across state
lines. Pendleton Howard, Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey, 87 UNIV. oF PA. L. REV. 262, 276 (1939).
36 William W. Godward, Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 728 (1935).
3
' Godward, supra n. 35; Howard, supra n. 34; McGovney, supra n. 13;
Stanley C. Morris, What Are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
of the United States?, 28 W. VA. L. QUART. 38 (1921).
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why should the privileges and immunities clause not be given its literal
interpretation?
The Colgate v. Harvey opinion seemed to indicate a new trend in
Court decisions, and the C.I.O. case, since it invoked the privileges and
immunities doctrine, gave the trend some impetus, though the factual
situation itself did not extend the applicability of the doctrine. The
concurring opinions in the case of Edwards v. California indicate a possible reinstatement of the trend. They are the first judicial expressions
since the passage of the Amendment that freedom of ingress into a state
is a right of citizenship, which is some evidence that the clause is not
altogether without meaning and potential vitality. Mr. Justice Black
has consistently arrayed himself on the side of the clause and it has
been suggested that this fact indicates a constitutional strategy to
develop the potentialities of this clause." Whether or not "strategy"
is the proper terminology may be questioned, but it is not open to
doubt that he has gone far to rank himself with the proponents of the
clause. The reading of the opinions themselves, none of which he has
written, does not shed much light on his reasons for upholding the
use of the "almost forgotten clause" because each of the recent cases
has been of such different subject matter that no clear line of reasoning
can be drawn from them.
If the privileges and immunities clause is going to be invoked more
frequently, as would seem to be the case, the due process clause may
perhaps be given correspondingly less prominence in the field of constitutional decisions pertaining to civil rights. But it is not here suggested that the due process clause will be confined to procedural guarintees, thus increasing the permissible scope of state actioxa where civil
liberties are not involved, by the simple expedient of extending the
scope of the privileges and immunities clause." Substantive due process
decisions are so numerous and of such long standing that a wholesale
retrenchment by the Court from this field would appear most unlikely.
The cases during the past decade have not served to broaden the
interpretation of the privileges and immunities clause but they serve
to indicate that some members of the Supreme Court are thinking of
that clause as a purposeful phrase-which fact many had begun to
doubt. The present Court is a strong and jealous protector of the
individual against infringement of his personal freedom, and the time
seems propitious for an extension of the application of the privileges and
immunities clause, though perhaps the basis of its applicability will not
reach to the fundamental rights, as suggested by Mr. Justice Field,
but will be manifested in a liberal construction of the time-honored test
-the rights inherent in national citizenship as such.
31855 H.,v. L. R v. 874.
20 As was suggested in a note, 55 IA v. L. REv. 874.

